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Pennsylvania's Public Employe
Relations Act (Act 195) and
Impasse-The Public Employer's
Right to Make Unilateral Changes
in Employment Conditions
Kurt H. Decker, Esquire*
I. Introduction
The right of Pennsylvania's private sector labor force to bar-
gain collectively is protected by federal legislation in the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA),' and by state legislation in the Penn-
sylvania Labor Relations Act (PLRA).2 Public employees, however,
were excluded from these statutes.3 In Pennsylvania, public em-
ployee collective bargaining was considered a policy violation be-
cause of danger to the general welfare." This attitude changed in the
1960's and since 1968, the Pennsylvania Legislature has furthered
the rights of police, fire fighters, and all other public employees to
organize and bargain collectively. Act 111,1 enacted in 1968, pro-
* B.A. 1968, Thiel College; M.P.A. 1973, The Pennsylvania State University, J.D. 1976,
Vanderbilt University, LL.M. (Labor) 1980, Temple University; Associate, Stevens & Lee,
Reading, Pennsylvania; Former Assistant Attorney General, Pennsylvania Governor's Office,
Bureau of Labor Relations.
1. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1970 & Supp. 1 1976).
2. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, §§ 211.1-.13 (Purdon 1964
& Supp. 1981-82).
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970 & Supp. I 1976) (term "employer" does not include a
state or political subdivision thereof); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.3(c) (Purdon 1964 & Supp.
1981-82) (term "employer" does not include the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or a political
subdivision thereof).
4. See Philadelphia Fire Officers Ass'n v. Pa. L.R.B., 470 Pa. 550, 553, 369 A.2d 259,
260 (1977). It was considered part of the American tradition that there was "no right to strike
against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime." Broadwater v. Otto, 370 Pa. 611,
618, 88 A.2d 878, 880 (1952). q. De Blasio v. Cecil Township, 42 Wash. Co. 193, 28 D. &
C.2d 450 (1963) (Public employee strikes might cripple an important governmental function to
the detriment of the public); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.2 (Purdon 1964), partially repealed
by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.2201 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82) (prohibits public employee
strikes).
5. The Act of June 24, 1968, Pub. L. 237, No. 111- (Act 111), established the right of
policemen and firemen to organize and bargain collectively through selected representatives.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82).
vides for police and fire fighters collective bargaining; Act 195,6
passed in 1970, provides comprehensive collective bargaining by all
other public employees.
Public sector collective bargaining legislation has affected the
traditional unilateral decision-making of public employers. No
longer are public employees isolated individuals. Today, Penn-
sylvania's public employers increasingly confront employees united
in organizations and deal with them through a new set of relation-
ships circumscribed by collective bargaining that imposes bilateral
decision-making.
The concept of impasse is important for both the private and
public sectors. Impasse is a deadlock in negotiations when collective
bargaining has failed to produce an agreement and the parties are
confronted with the decision of whether to continue bargaining.
This article examines impasse as the primary exception to the rule
prohibiting unilateral public employer change of terms and condi-
tions of employment. The unique nature of public sector collective
bargaining and the lack of dispositive Pennsylvania authority on its'
many facets necessitates consideration of other sources for guidance.
Private and public sector court and labor board decisions are re-
viewed by balancing public sector labor relations needs with stan-
dards applied in the private sector.
II. The Impact of Private Sector Labor Rulings
on Pennsylvania's Public Sector
Collective bargaining is still a new concept in the public sector
with a paucity of decisions covering key issues. Because public sec-
tor labor relations is regulated by individual state or local statutes,
executive orders, and attorney general opinions, the case law in any
jurisdiction may be limited or nonexistent.7 Applicability of case
law among different jurisdictions may be restricted because collec-
tive bargaining laws vary. Precedent is extensive in the private sec-
tor, however, since the NLRA is interpreted through a centralized
agency, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
Several public sector tribunals have relied on private sector
precedents because the statutory language in both sectors often coin-
cides.' When parallel statutory language exists, the private sector
6. All Pennsylvania public employees other than police and fire fighters were given the
right to organize and bargain collectively by the Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195 (Act
195). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82).
7. At least 45 states provide some form of collective bargaining for either all or a por-
tion of their public employees. 51 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 501 (1981).
8. See, e.g., Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d
971, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1974); Kerrigan v. City of Boston, 361 Mass. 24, 278 N.E.2d 387
(1972); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 214 N.W.2d 803 (1974).
See also Drachman & Ambash, Is Looking Up Case Precedent in Other Jurisdictions Worth-
precedents may provide analogous authority. Blind deference is un-
warranted, however, unless the legislature intended the statute to be
so construed. 9
Although private sector precedents offer some guidance, public
sector issues cannot be interpreted solely by reference to the private
sector. Indeed, Pennsylvania courts have held that it is necessary to
consider "the distinctions that necessarily must exist between legisla-
tion primarily directed to the private sector and that for public em-
ployees." '
III. Unilateral Public Employer Action
The Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act (Act 195) gov-
erns labor relations for all public employees except police and fire
fighters. Its statutory language is patterned after the NLRA. Conse-
quently, private sector interpretations of the NLRA provide some
guidance to Act 195's meaning, but are not controlling."l Collective
bargaining pursuant to Act 195 entails a mutual obligation by the
public employer and the employees' representative to confer in good
faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment.'2 This requirement is similar to the NLRA's good faith
bargaining obligation.' 3 Act 195's goal is to bring parties to the ne-
while in Public Sector Labor RelationsP'-A Management Perspective, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 209
(1977); Kahn, Is Looking Up Case Precedent in Other Jurisdictions Worthwhile in Public Sector
Labor Relations?-The Perspective of a Neutral, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 221 (1977).
9. For example, the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act provides that the Agri-
cultural Labor Relations Board "shall follow applicable precedents of the National Labor Re-
lations Act as amended." CAL. LAB. CODE § 1148 (Deering 1976 & Supp. 1981).
10. State College Educ. Ass'n v. Pa. L.R.B., 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 229, 306 A.2d 404 (1973),
afl'd, 461 Pa. 494, 499, 337 A.2d 262, 264 (1975). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also
stated:
We emphasize that we are not suggesting that the experience gained in the private
sector is of no value here, rather we are stressing that analogies have limited applica-
tion and the experience gained in the private employment sector will not necessarily
provide an infallible basis for a monolithic model for public employment.
Id at 500, 337 A.2d at 264-65. See also Pa. L.R.B. v. AFSCME, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 376, 348
A.2d 921 (1975); Borough of Wilkinsburg v. Sanitation Dep't., 463 Pa. 521, 345 A.2d 641
(1975).
11. State College Educ. Ass'n v. Pa. L.R.B., 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 224, 306 A.2d 404 (1973),
aft'd, 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Section 1101.701 of Act
195 provides:
Collective bargaining is the performance of the mutual obligation of the public em-
ployer and the representative of the public employe to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any question arising thereunder
and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession.
Id
13. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970 & Supp. 1 1976). Section 158(d) of the NLRA provides:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
gotiating table who are willing to: (1) present proposals supported
by reasons; (2) listen to and evaluate proposals; and (3) ultimately
reach an understanding that forms the foundation for a written
agreement.1 4 The duty to bargain does not, however, require a party
to participate in fruitless marathon discussions.' 5 When irreconcila-
ble differences remain after exhaustive negotiations, Act 195 ac-
knowledges the existence of an impasse, which is a deadlock in the
negotiating process that suspends the statutory bargaining obliga-
tion. ' 6
A. The Impasse Exception
The most important statutory limitation upon unilateral pub-
lic employer change of employment conditions is section
1101.1201(a)(5) of Act 195,11 which is similar to section 158(a)(5) of
the NLRA.18 Both make it an unfair labor practice to refuse to bar-
gain in good faith. Section 1101.1201(a)(5) is significant only after
the union obtains bargaining rights, and it affects unilateral public
employer action in two ways.' 9 First, it determines the range of sub-
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession
Id
For a discussion of the private sector's duty to bargain in good faith, see Cox, The Duty to
Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1401 (1958); Fleming, The Obligation to Bargain in
GoodFaith, 47 VA. L. REv. 988 (1961); Gross, Cullen & Hanslowe, GoodFaith in Labor Nego-
tiations: Tests and Remedies, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1009 (1968).
14. See Comment, A Power Shift in Public School Management, 80 DICK. L. REv. 795
(1976); Comment, The Scope of Collective Bargaining in Public Education under the Penn-
sylvania Public Employe Relations Act, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 427 (1976).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, § 1101.701 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82); Pa. L.R.B. v. Com., State
Liquor Control Bd., 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 145, 367 A.2d 805 (1977). For private sector authority
see NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952); National Labor Relations Board v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.701, 1101.801 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82).
17. Id § 1101.1201(a)(5). This section relates to unfair labor practices by public employ-
ers and prohibits "[refusal] to bargain collectively in good faith with an employe representative
which is the exclusive representative of employes in an appropriate unit, including but not
limited to the discussing of grievances with the exclusive representative." Id
18. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970 & Supp. 11976). This section concerns unfair labor prac-
tices by private employers and prohibits a "[refusal] to bargain collectively with the represen-
tative of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." Id
Section 159(a) provides that:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other con-
ditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer
and to have such grievances adjusted, without intervention of the bargaining repre-
sentative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-
bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargain-
ing representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment
Id § 159(a).
19. Act 195 bargaining rights may be obtained through a Pennsylvania Labor Relations
jects that the union may properly insist upon negotiating. This in-
cludes recognition of "bargainable," "nonbargainable," and
"permissive" negotiation subjects.2' Bargainable or mandatory
items must be negotiated and a refusal to negotiate constitutes an
unfair labor practice. Permissive or nonmandatory subjects may
only be negotiated if the parties agree. Consequently, if the parties
have agreed to negotiate a permissive subject, an unfair labor prac-
tice may result for a refusal to bargain in good faith. Nonbargain-
able items need not be negotiated or discussed and an unfair labor
practice will not result from a refusal. This differentiation helps to
determine the contour of the bilateral agreement reached by the par-
ties in negotiations. Second, section 1101.1201(a)(5) limits the public
employer's right to take unilateral action because it prohibits em-
ployment condition changes absent prior negotiations with the
union. This prohibition emphasizes the importance of determining
what must, may, and may not be negotiated.
Nevertheless, the prohibition against unilateral action under
section 1101.1201 (a)(5) does not absolutely bar changes by the public
employer, who is merely required to bargain in good faith to impasse
before taking unilateral action. Consequently, the importance of im-
passe is its status as the major exception to the rule2 ' that a public
employer violates section 1101.1201(a)(5) by implementing unilat-
Board (PLRB) certification of a Board conducted election, or by a voluntary recognition, or
through a bargaining order. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.601-.607 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82).
A similar procedure is followed in the private sector. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970 & Supp. I
1976). NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.701-.703 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82); Pa. L.R.B. v. State
College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975). A similar distinction exists in the
private sector. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970 & Supp. 1 1976). For a discussion of the mandatory,
permissive, and nonbargainable relationships in the private sector see C.J. MoRuus, THE DE-
VELOPING LABOR LAW 389-439 (1971).
21. For a survey of this rule under various circumstances encountered in Pennsylvania's
public sector see Pa. L.R.B. v. Williamsport Area, 486 Pa. 375, 406 A.2d 329 (1979); Appeal of
Cumberland Valley School Dist., 483 Pa. 134, 394 A.2d 946 (1978); Borough of Wilkinsburg v.
Sanitation Department, 463 Pa. 521, 345 A.2d 641 (1975); AFSCME v. Pa. L.R.B., 67 Mun.
176 (1975); Red Rose Transit Auth., 12 P.P.E.R. 112162 (1981); Borough of Carlisle, 11
P.P.E.R. 111172 (1980); Norristown Area School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 197 (1978); Reynolds
School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 135 (1978); Sto-Rox School Bd., 9 P.P.E.R. 126 (1978); Clarion
County Comm'rs., 8 P.P.E.R. 106 (1977); Millcreek School Dist., 8 P.P.E.R. 47 (1976); Dallas-
town Area School Dist., 7 P.P.E.R. 102 (1976); Laurel School Dist., 6 P.P.E.R. 351 (1975);
Curwensville Area School Dist., 6 P.P.E.R. 327 (1975); New Brighton Area School Dist., 6
P.P.E.R. 296 (1965); Millersburg Area School Dist., 6 P.P.E.R. 290 (1975); Hickory Township
Bd. of Education, 6 P.P.E.R. 222 (1975); Upper St. Clair School Dist., 5 P.P.E.R. 96 (1974); W.
Mifflin Area School Dist., 5 P.P.E.R. 51 (1974); Highland Sewer & Water Auth., 4 P.P.E.R. 116
(1974); Reynolds School Bd., 3 P.P.E.R. 228 (1973); Borough of Berwick, 3 P.P.E.R. 183
(1973); City of Phila., 3 P.P.E.R. 143 (1973); See airo S. Butler County School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R:
46 (1978). In the private sector see NLRB v. Almeida Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 729 (1st Cir.
1964); NLRB v. Intercoastal Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1961); Stratford Indus.,
Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 682 (1974); Midwest Casting Corp., 194 N.L.RB. 523 (1971); Eddie's Chop
House, 165 N.L.R.B. 861 (1967); Korn Indus., Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 866 (1966); American Laun-
dry Machinery Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1954); Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 107 N.L.1LB. 34
(1953).
eral changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of em-
ployment.
Impasse is a factual and judgmental matter, requiring an ex-
haustion of the possibility of reaching agreement.22 Before public
employer unilateral action on a particular matter is permitted, im-
passe must have been reached on that issue.23 Under Act 195, this
includes resorting to, fully utilizing, and exhausting the Act's im-
passe resolution mechanisms. 24  After exhausting the Act's impasse
resolution mechanisms, the public employer may grant benefits or
make other changes that improve the terms and conditions of em-
ployment but do not exceed those offered in negotiations. 25 A reduc-
tion in benefits is permitted after impasse if this was discussed in
22. Borough of Carlisle, I 1 P.P.E.R. 1111172 (1980). Examples of the factors that evi-
dence impasse in the private sector are set forth in Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475,
478 (1967),petition for review dismissed, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Taft is cited in numer-
ous cases dealing with impasse. See, e.g., Supak & Sons v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 998 (6th Cir.
1972); Wantagh Auto Sales, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 153; C153 (1969).
Factors that may indicate that an impasse has been reached include bargaining history,
the good faith of the parties in the negotiations, the length of negotiations and number of
bargaining sessions, the significance of the items to the parties in light of particular bargaining
objectives, the absence of movement on open issues, the use of mediation or conciliation when
the mediator has split the parties up, the making of a final offer, the absence of counter propos-
als to such an offer, and the stated positions and understandings of the parties that there is an
impasse.
23. Pa. L.R.B. v. Williamsport Area, 486 Pa. 375, 406 A.2d 329 (1979); Appeal of Cum-
berland Valley School Dist., 483 Pa. 134, 394 A.2d 946 (1978); Red Rose Transit Auth., 12
P.P.E.R. 12162 (1981); Borough of Carlisle, 11 P.P.E.R. 11172 (1980); Norristown Area
School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 197 (1978); Reynolds School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 135 (1978); Sto-Rox
School Bd., 9 P.P.E.R. 126 (1978); City of Phila., 3 P.P.E.R. 143 (1973). For private sector
cases see Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 354 (1971); Laclede Gas Co., 171 N.L.R.B.
1392 (1968).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.801-.807, 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82). These
sections detail the resolution mechanisms followed prior to any lawful strike or to a public
employer's unilateral change in employment conditions. The collective bargaining parties are
required to submit to, utilize, and exhaust mediation procedures. Fact-finding may also be
required by the PLRB; however, binding arbitration is voluntary. After exhausting these im-
passe resolution procedures, certain public employees may strike and the public employer may
impose unilateral changes. For discussions of impasse and the public employer's duty to ex-
haust impasse resolution procedures prior to making any unilateral changes, see Pa. L.R.B. v.
Williamsport Area, 486 Pa. 375, 406 A.2d 329 (1979); Appeal of Cumberland Valley School
Dist., 483 Pa. 134, 151, 394 A.2d 946, 955 (1978); Borough of Carlisle, I1 P.P.E.R. 111172
(1980); Norristown Area School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 197 (1978); Sto-Rox School Bd., 9 P.P.E.R.
127 (1978); Millcreek School Dist., 8 P.P.E.R. 47 (1976). For an article examining the opera-
tion of impasse resolution mechanisms see Decker, The Right to Strike for Pennsylvania's Pub-
lic Employees-Its Scope, Limits, and Ram'fications for the Public Employer, 17 DUQ. L. REV.
755 (1979).
25. Pa. L.R.B. v. Williamsport Area, 486 Pa. 375, 406 A.2d 329 (1979); Appeal of Cum-
berland Valley School Dist., 483 Pa. 134, 151, 394 A.2d 946, 955 (1978); Red Rose Transit
Auth., 12 P.P.E.R. T 12162 (1981); Borough of Carlisle, 11 P.P.E.R. 1 11172 (1980); Norristown
Area School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 197 (1978); Reynolds School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 135 (1978); Sto-
Rox School Bd., 9 P.P.E.R. 126 (1978); City of Phila., 3 P.P.E.R. 143 (1973). In the private
sector compare Manor Mining & Contracting Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1972), Falcon Tank
Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 333 (1971), and Terry Indus., 188 N.L.R.B. 745 (1971), in which the uni-
lateral increases exceeded pre-impasse proposals, with Continental Nut Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 841
(1972), Midwest Casting Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 523 (1971), and Chemical Producers Corp., 183
N.L.R.B. 141 (1970), in which the increases did not excess pre-impasse proposals.
negotiations.26 The overall public employer's good faith in negotia-
tions is also relevant in determining the propriety of unilateral public
employer conduct allegedly warranted by impasse.27
After impasse has been reached, Act 195 permits a public em-
ployer to make certain changes in employment conditions. Any uni-
lateral change, however, must be reasonably comprehended within a
public employer's pre-impasse proposals. Thus, when good faith
bargaining results in impasse and the Act's impasse resolution pro-
cedures are utilized and exhausted, a public employer may unilater-
ally institute changes that are equal to or no more favorable than
those offered or approved in the negotiations preceding impasse.28
This rule is necessary because when further discussions become un-
productive, a rule requiring the freezing of employment terms and
conditions may impair the governmental services offered and disad-
vantage the employees. 29 Taxpayers may be adversely affected if the
public employer continues to spend funds for services no longer cov-
ered by a contract.
Furthermore, permitting unilateral change after impasse does
not simply benefit public employers, but provides flexibility in deal-
ing with the union. The union's desire to continue discussion should
not indefinitely bind the public employer to maintain the status quo.
Unilateral change after impasse is justified not only to possibly break
the impasse and resume productive negotiations, but also because
the failure of the parties to reach an agreement through good faith
negotiations should not permanently restrain the public employer
from making changes.30
26. See note 23 supra. For additional private sector authority see Teamsters Local 745 v.
NLRB, 355 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1966); DuPont & Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 753 (1971).
27. Pa. L.R.B. v. Williamsport Area, 486 Pa. 375, 406 A.2d 329 (1979); Appeal of Cum-
berland Valley School Dist., 483 Pa. 134, 151, 394 A.2d 946, 955 (1978); Borough of Wilkins-
burg v. Sanitation Dep't, 463 Pa. 521, 345 A.2d 641 (1975); Red Rose Transit Auth., 12
P.P.E.R. 12162 (1981); Borough of Carlisle, 11 P.P.E.R. 11172 (1980); Norristown Area
School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 197 (1978); Sto-Rox School Bd., 9 P.P.E.R. 126 (1978); Highland
Sewer & Water Auth., 4 P.P.E.R. 116 (1974). In the private sector, see Molders Local 155 v.
NLRB, 442 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
28. See note 21 supra.
29. A rule that freezes the terms and conditions of employment appears to directly con-
tradict Act 195's express terms. Section 1101.701 states in part that the "obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.701 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82). A number of commentators have addressed
aspects of this doctrine. See, e.g., Bowman, An Employer's UnilateralAction-An Unfair Labor
Practice?, 9 VAND. L. REV. 487, 500 (1956); Murphy, Impasse and the Duty to Bargain in Good
Faith, 39 U. PiTT. L. REV. 1, 20-49 (1977); Rabin, Limitations on Employer Independent Action,
27 VAND. L. REV. 133, 188-89 (1974); Schatski, The Employer's UnilateralAct-4 Per Se Viola-
tion-Sometimes, 44 TEx. L. REv. 470, 495 (1966); Stewart & Engeman, Impasse, Collective
Bargaining andAction, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 233, 240-48 (1970); Comment, Impasse in Collective
Bargaining, 44 TEx. L. REV. 769 (1966).
30. Within the private sector, the NLRB has set forth in detail a rationale for post-im-
passe change in working conditions:
This freedom of action which the employer has after, but not before, the impasse
springs from the fact that having bargained in good faith to impasse, he has satisfied
Realistically, the public employer's action is not "unilateral" be-
cause the union may be seeking the concession of at least as much as
the public employer granted at impasse. Even though the union is
frozen into its bargaining position, this should not preclude the pub-
lic employer from implementing "implicitly" agreed-upon changes.
The announcement of a change is not an erosion of the bargaining
obligation or a disparagement of the union's status because the
union can claim some credit for the benefit obtained.3
Impasse is noteworthy for an additional reason. After impasse,
either party may decline to continue negotiations. Because impasse
signifies that the parties have exhausted the avenues of bargaining,
termination of bargaining cannot be regarded as demonstrating a
state of mind against reaching agreement.32
It is arguable that impasse should not be necessary to allow the
employer to implement an improvement in wages, hours, and condi-
tions of employment that it has already offered the union but which
the union has rejected. In such situations, the public employer is at
least partially complying with the union's demands, especially if it
acted without prejudice to continued negotiations on those matters,
did not deprive employees of their rights, and did not disparage or
undermine the bargaining agent.33 A pre-impasse unilateral increase
may be possible, provided it is an amount already rejected by the
union and is implemented only after notice to and consultation with
the union.34
his statutory duty to determine working conditions, if possible, by agreement with his
employees. Having fulfilled his obligation to fix working conditions by joint action,
he acquires a limited right to fix them unilaterally, that is, he is limited to the confines
of his preimpasse offers or proposals. Any other changes he were to institute might, if
offered before or after the impasse, have led or lead to progress or success in the
collective negotiations; hence unilateral action of this different scope forecloses this
possibility, just as would his refusal to consider a proposal, with a violation as appar-
ent in the one instance as in the other. In explaining this result, it is sometimes said
that the employer's postimpasse action "breaks" the previous impasse, although it is
perhaps more precise and less susceptible of misinterpretation to say that no impasse
can be said to have been reached when the reference is to changes never introduced
into the collective bargaining arena. Or, applying another familiar formulation, the
employer may not be heard to say that had he offered his unilaterally instituted
changes to the employees' representative, the resulting negotiations (which could as a
result have taken on new directions or scope) would nevertheless have ended in dead-
lock.
Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 59, 65 (1964).
31. MURPHY, supra note 29, at 25-26.
32. Cheney CaL Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 319 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1963).
33. See NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 192 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1951).
34. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745 n.12 (1962). In Katz, the Supreme Court, after
finding that a pre-impasse wage increase in excess of that offered the union in negotiations was
illegal, stated that "there is no resemblance between this situation and one wherein an em-
ployer, after notice and consultation, 'unilaterally' institutes a wage increase identical with one
which the union has rejected as too low." The Supreme Court cited the court of appeals
decision in Bradley Washfountain, 319 F.2d 144, 147 (7th Cir. 1951). The Katz opinion re-
ferred to a hypothetical wage increase granted after impasse, but the Bradley Washfountain
decision encompassed a pre-impasse increase, if the increased amount has already been re-
jected by the union and is implemented only after notice to and consultation with the union.
Not only is the concept of impasse important for unilateral pub-
lic employer action, it also relates closely to the permissibility or le-
gality of any Act 195 strike. Act 195 altered prior Pennsylvania law
by granting public employees a right to strike.35 Not all employees,
however, enjoy this privilege. Furthermore, those who are permitted
to strike do not enjoy rights identical to those in the private sector.36
A legal or permissible Act 195 strike is one by public employees who
are statutorily accorded the strike right. The right commences after
the use and exhaustion of the impasse procedures.37 Illegal strikes
include all others. Examples of illegal strikes are those occurring (1)
by employees not statutorily accorded the right; (2) prior to the exist-
ence of any collective bargaining agreement; (3) during the existence
of any collective bargaining agreement; or (4) prior to utilizing and
exhausting the impasse procedures to be followed before beginning a
legal strike.
Prior to engaging in any strike, public employees must utilize
and exhaust Act 195's impasse procedures. 38 These impasse proce-
dures include mediation 39 and fact finding.' Refusal by either the
public employee or the public employer representative to submit to
Act 195's impasse procedures is an unfair labor practice 4' and consti-
tutes a refusal to bargain in good faith. A complaint may be filed by
either party or by the PLRB.42 After exhaustion, strikes are not pro-
hibited unless or until they create "a clear and present danger or
threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public. '43 This legisla-
tive pronouncement indicates willingness to accept certain inconve-
niences caused by public employee strikes. A strike is allowed,
The Katz court's endorsement is not expressly conditioned upon the existence of an impasse.
Nonetheless, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) adheres to its' position that unilat-
eral changes made prior to impasse, are tantamount to a refusal to bargain. See Alsey
Refractories Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 785 (1974).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.0110-. 1010 (Pardon Supp. 1981-82). Act 195 defines a
"strike" as:
[C]oncerted action in failing to report for duty, the wilful absence from one's posi-
tion, the stoppage of work, slowdown, or the abstinence in whole or in part from the
full, faithful and proper performance of the duties of employment for the purpose of
inducing, influencing or coercing a change in the conditions or compensation or the
rights, privileges, or obligations of employment.
Id § 1101.301(9). For a discussion of the strike right for Pennsylvania's public employees see
[Decker], supra note 24.
36. In the private sector, the strike right exists without the constraints imposed in the
public sector. For a survey of the private sector strike right and its perimeters, see Morris,
supra note 20, at 517-34.
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1001-.1003 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82).
38. Id §§ 1001.1002-.1003; see also United Transp. Union v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 22
Pa. Commw. Ct. 25, 347 A.2d 509 (1975).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1001.801 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82).
40. Id § 1001.802.
41. Id § 1001.803; see also id §§ 1001.1201(a)(5), l001.1201(bX3).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1001.803 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82).
43. Id § 1001.1003.
however, only after prescribed impasse procedures are utilized and
exhausted by certain public employees.
Utilization and exhaustion of the Act's impasse procedures are
significant for unions and public employers. Unions must comply
with this prerequisite before any legal strike may occur. Similarly,
public employers must meet this requirement before any unilateral
change in employment conditions can be implemented.
B. Limitations on the Impasse Exception
Limitations exist, however, on the public employer's right to
make unilateral changes after impasse. Specifically, these limitations
are on (1) the extent of the change-no unilateral change is permit-
ted if it is not included in the proposals offered to the union during
negotiations; (2) the context of the change-the impasse must have
resulted from good faith bargaining; (3) the manner of the change-
the unilateral action must not disparage the employes' bargaining
representative or the collective bargaining process; and (4) the effect
of the contract's expiration--despite the contract's expiration the
unilateral change must still occur during an impasse that results after
the Act's impasse procedures have been utilized and exhausted.
1. Extent of Change.-The first limitation is a constraint on
public employer action and requires that the subject of the unilat-
eral change must have been discussed during negotiations. 44 During
the negotiations in Appeal of Cumberland Valley School District,45
neither party proposed the reduction or elimination of fringe bene-
fits. After the contract's expiration, the public employer unilaterally
cancelled the fringe benefits. Because this unilateral change had not
been discussed during negotiations, the public employer committed
an unfair labor practice.46
This limitation includes the extent of the change. If, after im-
passe occurs regarding wages, the public employer grants to its em-
ployees a wage increase greater than any offered at the bargaining
table, an Act 195 violation results.47 This limitation on post-impasse
44. Appeal of Cumberland Valley School Dist., 483 Pa. 134, 394 A.2d 946 (1978); Bor-
ough of Carlisle, II P.P.E.R. 11172 (1980); Reynolds School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 135 (1978);
Sto-Rox School Bd., 9 P.P.E.R. 126 (1978); Clarion County Comm'rs., 8 P.P.E.R. 106 (1977);
Highland Sewer & Water Auth., 4 P.P.E.R. 116 (1974); Reynolds School Bd., 3 P.P.E.R. 228
(1973); City of Phila., 3 P.P.E.R. 143 (1973). In the private sector see I.B.S. Mfg. Co., 96
N.L.R.B. 1263, 1268 (1951), enforcement denied, 210 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1954).
45. 483 Pa. 134, 394 A.2d 946 (1978). But see Borough of Carlisle, 11 P.P.E.R. 111172
(1980).
46. Id
47. Highland Sewer & Water Auth., 4 P.P.E.R. 116 (1974); Reynolds School Bd., 3
P.P.E.R. 228 (1973). For private sector cases see NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337
U.S. 217 (1949); Horizon Communications Corp., 211 N.L.R.B. 792 (1974).
changes also encompasses unilateral decreases." A corollary to the
rule is that a public employer may only make unilateral changes to
the extent the changes are consistent with rejected offers to the
union.4 9 An overall impasse will not justify unilateral changes re-
garding a subject not bargained." For a unilateral change to be
valid it cannot involve an item not offered to or bargained over with
the union.
Unilateral increases or decreases effected without union discus-
sion constitute a refusal to bargain under Act 195. No discernible
justification for unilateral changes exists absent discussion between
the parties. A public employer bargaining in good faith must be
willing to make concessions and to obtain objectives through collec-
tive bargaining rather than use unilateral action as an end justifying
the means. If a public employer contemplates placing greater or
lesser benefits into effect it should offer them during negotiations.
An impasse may be avoided if the public employer makes such an
offer in early negotiation sessions. When a public employer effects a
unilateral change inconsistent with the position it maintained in ne-
gotiations, the employer's intent to reach agreement with the union
may be questioned."
2 Context of Change. Public employer unilateral action after
impasse is inapplicable if the deadlock results from bad faith or un-
fair labor practices.5 2 For example, a public employer may desire to
implement a unilateral change during bargaining. Since this can
only be accomplished after impasse, the employer may be tempted to
intentionally precipitate an impasse. A public employer cannot take
advantage of an impasse and act unilaterally if lawful conduct is
48. Borough of Carlisle, 11 P.P.E.R. 11172 (1980); Norristown Area School Dist., 9
P.P.E.R. 197 (1978); Reynolds School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 135 (1978); Sto-Rox School Bd., 9
P.P.E.R. 126 (1978); Clarion County Comm'rs, 8 P.P.E.R. 106 (1977); Borough of Berwick, 3
P.P.E.R. 183 (1973). For private sector cases see Times Herald Printing Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 225
(1975); DuPont & Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 753 (1971).
49. Appeal of Cumberland Valley School Dist., 483 Pa. 134, 394 A.2d 946 (1978); Bor-
ough of Carlisle, 11 P.P.E.R. 11172 (1980); Norristown Area School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 197
(1978); Reynolds School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 135 (1978); Sto-Rox School Bd., 9 P.P.E.R. 126
(1978); Clarion County Comm'rs., 988 P.P.E.R. 106 (1977); City of Phila., 3 P.P.E.R. 143
(1973).
50. Appeal of Cumberland Valley School Dist., 483 Pa. 134, 394 A.2d 946 (1978); Bor-
ough of Carlisle, 11 P.P.E.R. 11172 (1980); Reynolds School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 135 (1978);
Reynolds School Bd., 3 P.P.E.R. 228 (1973). In the private sector see Manor Mining & Con-
tracting Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1972).
51. See Murphy supra note 29, at 36.
52. Borough of Wilkinsburg v. Sanitation Dep't, 463 Pa. 521, 345 A.2d 641 (1975); Nor-
ristown Area School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 197 (1978); Reynolds School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 135 (1978);
Sto-Rox School Bd., 9 P.P.E.R. 126 (1978); Clarion County Comm'rs., 8 P.P.E.R. 106 (1977);
Highland Sewer & Water Auth., 4 P.P.E.R. 116 (1974); City of Phila., 3 P.P.E.R. 143 (1973).
For private sector cases see NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960);
NLRB v. Andrew Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1949), cert denied, 338 U.S. 827 (1949);
Metlox Mfg. Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1976); Vanette Hosiery Mills, 114 N.L.R.B. 1107 (1955).
used to reach the impasse.53 Furthermore, a public employer may
not differentiate between union and nonunion members in imple-
menting a unilateral change after impasse.5 ' For example, a public
employer cannot grant nonunion members a wage increase greater
than the increase extended to union members.
3. Manner of Change.-A public employer may not disparage
either the collective bargaining process or the union's prestige and
authority. For example, a public employer may not make unilateral
changes affording greater benefits than originally offered because
this undermines the bargaining agent's status and the negotiation
process." Similarly, if a public employer precipitates a bargaining
impasse through bad faith or another unfair labor practice, its con-
duct reflects a rejection of the collective bargaining principle or a
desire to undermine the union. Undermining the union may result if
the unilateral change only affects the union members and not the
nonunion members.56 Although the public employer may effect a
unilateral change after impasse, an impasse does not relieve a public
employer of all statutory obligations.
4. Contract Expiration. A public employer's opportunity to
make unilateral changes in employment conditions is also limited by
the contract's expiration. This limitation arises when the contract
expires and no extension of the prior contract is negotiated. It also
occurs when the extension to a prior contract expires and no addi-
tional extensions are bargained. At this point, although no contract
exists between the parties to govern the employment relation, the
Act's impasse procedures still effect the public employer's ability to
make unilateral changes. The mediation and fact finding stages
contemplated by the Act as prerequisites to a strike must be utilized
and exhausted.57 Thus, before a public employer can make unilat-
53. Red Rose Transit Auth., 12 P.P.E.R. 112162 (1981); Norristown Area School Dist., 9
P.P.E.R. 197 (1978); Sto-Rox School Bd., 9 P.P.E.R. 126 (1978); City of Phila., 3 P.P.E.R. 143
(1973). For examples in the private sector see Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964); Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Work-
ers of America v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1964); Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 887 (1953); Akron Novelty Mfg. Co., 224 N.L.R.B. 998 (1976).
54. Appeal of Cumberland Valley School Dist., 483 Pa. 134, 394 A.2d 946 (1978).
55. Highland Sewer & Water Auth., 4 P.P.E.R. 116 (1974); Reynolds School Bd., 3
P.P.E.R. 228 (1973). For private sector cases see NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U.S.
217, 223 (1949); Consumers Co-op. Ref. Ass'n, 77 N.L.R.B. 528 (1948), enforced, 180 F.2d 581
(5th Cir. 1950); Dixie Culvert Mfg. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 554, 555 (1949).
56. Appeal of Cumberland Valley School Dist., 483 Pa. 134, 394 A.2d 946 (1978).
57. Id at 147, 394 A.2d at 955. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.801-.802 (Pur-
don Supp. 1981-82).
Before implementing a public employer unilateral change when contract expiration and
extension are involved, Pennsylvania's Unemployment Compensation Law must be consid-
ered. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 751-912.5 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1981-82). Unemployment
compensation benefits are not available to persons whose unemployment is due to a "str e"
eral changes both the union and employer are placed as relatively
equal positions. After exhaustion and utilization of the Act's im-
passe procedures, the union may strike. If it does not strike, it may
be subject to the public employer's unilateral change of employment
conditions absent agreement on any extension of the expired con-
tract during the impasse period. Should such a contract extension
exist during the impasse period, the public employer is still barred
from implementing any unilateral change. In this situation, the con-
tract extension during impasse must expire and the public employer
must utilize and exhaust the Act's impasse procedures before imple-
menting any unilateral change.
Consequently, a public employer cannot unilaterally decrease
or increase an expired contract's provisions until after bargaining to
impasse by utilizing and exhausting the Act's impasse procedures.
For example, if a contract containing a wage provision expires, the
public employer may not be required to continue wages and the em-
ployees may not be required to render services. No wage provision
is in effect. If the public employer desires to vary wages from the
expired contract, this still cannot be unilaterally implemented unless
impasse occurs and the Act's impasse procedures are utilized and
exhausted. Likewise, the union may not legally strike until these im-
passe procedures are utilized and exhausted. If in the interim, how-
ever, the public employer accepts the employees services without a
contract, it may still be required to remunerate under the old con-
tract. 58 Past practice, status quo, and other considerations may be-
come relevant.
rather than a "lockout." Id. at § 802(d). A "lockout" for which benefits are payable occurs
when a public employer does not grant the union's request for a contract extension covering a
reasonable period of time under the preexisting terms and conditions of employment. Centen-
nial School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, - Pa. Commw. Ct.
,424 A.2d 569 (1981); Chichester School Dist. v. Unemployment Compensation Board, 53
Pa. Commw. Ct. 74, 415 A.2d 997 (1980); McKeesport Area School Dist. v. Unemployment
Compensation Board, 40 Pa. Commw. Ct. 334, 397 A.2d 458 (1979); see also Vrotney Unem-
ployment Case, 400 Pa. 440, 163 A.2d 91 (1960). This strongly suggests that a contract exten-
sion must be permitted for a reasonable period of time when requested by the union.
Unilateral change is only permitted after this requested extension expires and the Act's im-
passe procedures have been exhausted. When the Act's impasse procedures have been ex-
hausted prior to this requested extension, unilateral change may only occur after the
extension's expiration, provided that an impasse still exists on the same basis as it existed prior
to any requested extension.
58. Various vested obligations may remain under an expired contract. Examples of
these vested obligations are vacation benefits, pension rights, and severance pay. For an article
discussing the public employer's obligations regarding these vested rights see Decker, Arbi-
trability ofPublic Sector Grievances after Expiration of a Contract, in 7 J. COLLECTIVE NEoOTI-
ATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 287 (1978). If a legal strike occurs after the contract expires
and Act 195's impasse procedures are exhausted, the public employer may discontinue bene-
fits. The rationale is that Act 195 prohibits the public employer from remunerating public
employees in any manner during a strike. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1006 (Purdon Supp.
1981-82); see also Hazelton Area Bd. of School Directors, 7 P.P.E.R. 169 (1976).
IV. Conclusion
If the public employer and the union have negotiated a pro-
posed contractual change and if the parties bargain to impasse utiliz-
ing and exhausting Act 195's impasse procedures, the employer may
implement the change. Absent a legitimate impasse and the failure
to bargain the subject of a unilateral change, implementation cannot
occur. The rule requiring utilization and exhaustion of the Act's im-
passe procedures is sound. Both the permanence of unilateral
change and the likelihood that the public employer who unilaterally
changes benefits does not genuinely desire to reach agreement re-
quire various restrictions on the right to implement a unilateral
change. These include (1) the extent of the change; (2) the context
of the change; (3) the manner of the change; and (4) the contract's
expiration. In sum, the public employer's ability to effectuate legiti-
mate unilateral changes after impasse will facilitate negotiations by
encouraging the resumption of negotiations and the conclusion of a
contract.
